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MBA EXPENSES CAN BE
DEDUCTIBLE: REVISITING
THE AGED SHERMAN CASE
KATHERINE D. BLACK & JEFFREY N. BARNES
SOUTHERN UTAH UNIVERSITY

ABSTRACT
For years, the deductibility of educational expenses was a contentious area of
tax law. However, over the past decade Congress has passed numerous provisions
designed to allow taxpayers to deduct the cost of education. Thus, the emphasis has
changed from “is the expense deductible” to “what kind of expense is it”, “who wants
to take it” and “in what form do they want to take the deduction”?
It has always been more difficult to deduct the expenses of getting a graduate
education and was impossible if it led to a professional degree (e.g. law, medicine,
CPA). Deducting the expenses of an MBA degree, however, was a different matter.
The MBA did not prepare someone to enter a new field, since anybody could own a
business, thus, MBA expenses were the source of several lawsuits that tried to draw
some bright line tests. However, Congress has rendered some of those tests
unnecessary for some taxpayers and may have simply created new tests and new
methods of deductibility for others.
However, taking the deduction under §162 results in a greater deduction and is
not subject to AGI limitations. Therefore, it is still important to analyze the deduction
under §162 and only rely on the other provisions, if necessary. This is especially
important because the IRS has not acquiesced to the Tax Court’s positions despite the
numerous cases to the contrary. Therefore, although the regulation seems clear and
the cases have gone so far as to indicate they are not going to follow the IRS’s
Revenue Ruling, the IRS seems entrenched in its position establishing a continuous
string of ever increasing hurdles that are not on the face of the Regulation,
congressional intent, or the court cases of petitioners.
I. CODE SECTIONS PROVIDING FOR
DEDUCTIBILITY OF EDUCATION EXPENSES--§162
There are numerous Code and Regulation sections designed to provide a
deduction for the cost of education. The most liberal is found in Regulation §162(5)(b) which provides that an individual may deduct education expenses as ordinary
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and necessary business expenses provided the expenses are incurred for either of two
reasons:
1.
2.

To maintain or improve existing skills required in the present job; or
To meet the express requirements of the employer or the requirements
imposed by law to retain his or her employment status.
Education expenses are not deductible if either of the following applies:

1.
2.

The education meets the minimum educational standards for
qualification in the taxpayer's existing job; or
The education qualifies the taxpayer for a new trade or business.i

If these requirements are met all of the expenses, (including travel expenses)
are deductible for AGI as ordinary and necessary business expenses. However, fees
incurred for professional qualification exams (the CPA or BAR exam, for example)
and fees for review courses (such as a CPA or BAR review course) are not
deductible.ii
If the education maintains or improves existing skills and does not qualify a
person for a new trade or business, the deduction still can be taken. Even if the
education results in a promotion or raise, a change in duties does not negate the
deduction if the new duties involve the same general work. For example, a practicing
dentist's education expenses incurred to become an orthodontist are deductible,iii and a
teacher who got a doctoral degree and became a principal still had deductible
expenses.iv
Reg. §1.162-5(a) provides:
“General rule. --Expenditures made by an individual for education
(including research undertaken as part of his educational program) which
are not expenditures of a type described in paragraph (b)(2) or (3) of this
section are deductible as ordinary and necessary business expenses”
(for AGI).
Despite the fact that the Regulation provides that the expenses of an individual
are deductible as ordinary and necessary business expenses, IRS Publication 508
provides that if that individual is not self-employed the deductions are employee
business expenses deductible as itemized deductions (from AGI). Although the IRS
position in Publication 508 seems to be consistent with the treatment of other business
expenses of self-employed individuals vs. employees, the publication goes contrary to
Mountain Plains Journal of Business and Economics, Volume 6, 2005

57

the Regulation which seems to provide otherwise.
Further, the Regulation provides an exception that seems to clarify the language
in subparagraph (a), it reads:
(b) Nondeductible educational expenditures
(1) In general. --Educational expenditures described in
subparagraphs (2) and (3) of this paragraph are personal expenditures or
constitute an inseparable aggregate of personal and capital expenditures
and, therefore, are not deductible as ordinary and necessary business
expenses even though the education may maintain or improve skills
required by the individual in his employment or other trade or business
or may meet the express requirements of the individual's employer or of
applicable law or regulations.
Thus, if the expenditures are not the kind described in subparagraphs 2 and 3,
(the education meets the minimum educational standards for qualification in the
taxpayer's existing job or the education qualifies the taxpayer for a new trade or
business)v they are deductible as ordinary and necessary business expenses when they
maintain or improve the skills of an employee or meet the express requirements of the
employer. The regulation envisions employee deductions as ordinary and necessary
business deductions not as employee business expenses as the Publication suggests.
Presumably, taxpayers could argue that IRS Publication 508 contravenes the intent of
Congress and the specific wording of the Regulation.
Deductible educational expenses include tuition, books, supplies, lab fees and
similar items; certain transportation and travel costs; and other educational expenses,
such as costs of researching and typing when writing a paper as part of an educational
program (IRS Publication 508).
II. EDUCATION MUST BEAR A CLOSE
RELATIONSHIP TO TAXPAYER’S FORMER DUTIES
The court in Heffernan v. Commissionervi stated that in the context of Code
§162(a) it must be established that the education expenses bear "a proximate and
direct relationship" to the taxpayer's employment or trade or business.
The court further elaborated in Blair v. Commissioner, Docket Nos. 4715-79,
10695-79, 41 TCM 289, TC Memo. 1980-488, which related to two years of
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educational expenses:
In the case of an employee, a change of duties does not constitute a new
trade or business if the new duties involve the same general type of work
as is involved in the individual's present employment.
***
We think that, under any realistic interpretation, petitioner falls within
the ambit of this regulation. There was a substantial overlap in
petitioner's job tasks, the only major difference being that a Sherwin
Williams personnel manager makes decisions while a personnel
representative only makes recommendations. Neither that difference nor
the acquisition of a new title is enough to constitute being a personnel
representative and being a personnel manager as separate trades or
businesses. See Glenn v. Commissioner [Dec. 32,613], 62 T. C. 270,
275 (1974). We note in passing that even if "personnel manager" were
in in this situation a new trade or business, the educational expenses
nonetheless would be deductible unless they qualified petitioner for such
new trade or business.
Respondent further suggests that the new trade or business condition is
met because petitioner's program of study partially satisfies Ohio's
requirements for registration as a public accountant. See Ohio Rev.
Code Ann. sec. 4701.07 (Page 1977).
Ohio requires that a public accountant have an education "substantially
the equivalent of an accounting concentration." Ohio Rev. Code Ann.
sec. 4701.07(D) (Page 1977). Petitioner's studies at Baldwin-Wallace
were far from that. Respondent's contention that petitioner's M. B. A. is
"one step along the way" to qualifying her as a public accountant is
simply too tenuous, in the context of this case, to merit consideration.
Our perception would have been different if the factual background
herein were such that we could perceive an unfolding pattern of action
by petitioner which would have qualified her as a public accountant.
But, we do not believe an isolated venture into the educational world is
enough to require the disallowance of an educational expense where
such a pattern does not exist and the education undertaken clearly
improves the taxpayer's skills in an existing trade or business.
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Finally, we reach the question whether petitioner's graduate studies
improved her skills as a personnel representative and personnel manager.
The question is one of fact and the burden of proof is on the petitioners.
Schwartz v. Commissioner [Dec. 35,020 ], 69 T. C. 877, 889 (1978).
Initially, we note that the fact that petitioner was reimbursed for her
tuition expenses is not determinative, although it is relevant.
There are a plethora of decided cases in this area. We see no need to
delve into the wide variety of nuances with which the opinions in such
cases abound. Although petitioners' supporting evidence does not cross
every "t" nor dot every "i," the record before us is sufficient to cause us
to conclude that petitioners have carried their burden of proof. We hold
that petitioners are, with the exception attributable to the expenses
relating to the course in Marketing Information Systems (which they
concede are not deductible), entitled to the claimed deductions.
As far as the travel expenses are concerned, respondent does not ask us
to deal with these separately and disallow any portion thereof as
commuting expenses. We, therefore, hold that petitioners are entitled to
deduct their claimed travel expenses except with respect to one-sixth of
the amount expended in 1975, attributable to the Marketing Information
Systems course.
In the recent T.C. Summary Opinion 2003-58,vii(1997) the petitioner was not
employed in a managerial position, prior to enrolling in his MIT MBA program. He
was employed with Arthur Andersen in Beijing, China. The petitioner helped foreign
companies develop joint venture strategies and financial structures for operations in
China; he advised foreign companies on Chinese tax policies; and he helped
companies develop marketing strategies for sale in China and was not in a managerial
position. After his MIT MBA education, the petitioner joined Morgan Stanley’s
investment banking division as an investment banker, again, not in a managerial
position.
The distinguishing factor in this most recent case is that the petitioner went
from a non-management responsibility position to an unrelated non-managementrelated position. The Tax Court focused on the fact that the courses did not “improve”
the skills required by the taxpayer petitioner in his former line of work. Thus, going
from accounting into management or vice versa is not improving skills in the same job
field.
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III. OTHER EDUCATION DEDUCTION
FOR AGI, §222 (APPLICABLE FOR 2002 TO 2006)
Code §222 provides a deduction for AGI for qualified tuition and related
expenses for individuals beginning after December 31, 2001, and before January 1,
2006. This deduction is equal to the qualified tuition and related expenses paid by the
taxpayer during the taxable year and is limited by the taxpayer's adjusted gross
income (AGI).
§162 relates to business expenses. The language of the regulation provides that
expenditures made by an individual for education are deductible as ordinary and
necessary business expenses as if part of a business. This deviates from the normal
ordinary and necessary business expense deduction as there is no nexus with a
business. The deduction under Code §222 parallels this same approach in that it
provides a deduction for individuals as a deduction for AGI again without the
requirement of a business or a business connection. Presumably since the deduction
under Code §222 is not tied to a “business”, its deductibility for AGI will not be
redefined by the IRS. Classification as a “for AGI” deduction avoids the 2 percent-ofAGI floor on miscellaneous itemized deductions such as employee business expenses.
Interestingly, this new code section allows the deduction for AGI and was
enacted after Reg. §162-5 became effective. Reg. §1.162-5 provides that the
deduction is allowable by an individual for AGI which is the same language used in
the new Code §222.
If an expense is deductible under any other provision, it is not deductible under
this provision. "Qualified tuition and related expenses" are tuition and fees required
for the enrollment or attendance of the taxpayer, the taxpayer's spouse, or any
dependent for whom the taxpayer is entitled to deduct a dependency exemption, at an
eligible educational institution for courses of instruction.”viii This definition is the
same as that used for purposes of the Hope Scholarship and Lifetime Learning
credits.ix
In years 2004 and 2005, the amount of the deduction allowed under Code §222
is limited to $4,000 and is only available to taxpayers with adjusted gross income
(AGI) not exceeding $65,000 ($130,000 for joint filers). Taxpayers whose income
exceeds that limit but does not exceed $80,000 ($160,000 for joint filers) in 2004 or
2005 may deduct up to $2,000 in qualified expenses.
If the taxpayer takes a Hope Scholarship Credit or Lifetime Learning credit
with respect to a student, the qualified tuition and related expenses of that student
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which qualify for the credit are not deductible under Code §222. A taxpayer must
reduce the total amount of qualified tuition and related expenses by the amount
excluded for distributions from a qualified tuition plan, educational IRA or interest on
U.S. savings bonds used to pay for higher education. In addition, taxpayers may not
take a deduction for amounts excluded from income (i.e., GI benefits).
An individual who can be claimed as a dependent by another taxpayer cannot
take a deduction under this section. If a taxpayer is married, Code §222 applies only
if the taxpayer and his or her spouse file a joint return.x However, if the person elects
not to claim the dependent, the dependent may claim the deduction himself.
Obviously, the restrictions on the use of the deduction under Code §222 and the
limitations for AGI make reliance on Code §222 for the educational benefits less
desirable than under Code §162.
IV. HOPE AND LIFETIME LEARNING CREDITS—CODE §25A
The education credits (HOPE Scholarship Credit and the Lifetime Learning
Credit) under Code §25A, provide other tax benefits to individuals in connection with
their educational expenses. The HOPE scholarship credit and the Lifetime Learning
credit are both nonrefundable credits. They are available for qualifying tuition and
related expenses incurred by students pursuing undergraduate or graduate degrees.
Unlike the deductions allowed under §162, the credits do not allow any deduction for
room, board, and book costs.
The HOPE Scholarship Credit permits a maximum credit of $1,500 per year
(100 percent of the first $1,000 of tuition expenses plus 50 percent of the next $1,000
of tuition expenses) for the first two years of postsecondary education. The HOPE
Scholarship credit is available per eligible student. The Lifetime Learning credit
permits a credit of 20 percent of qualifying expenses (up to $10,000) incurred. The
Lifetime Learning credit is calculated per taxpayer. The credits may not be claimed
concurrently. Generally, the HOPE Scholarship Credit is used for the first two years
of post secondary education and the Lifetime Learning credit is used by individuals
who are beyond the first two years. Both credits are taken based on qualified
expenses incurred by a taxpayer, taxpayer's spouse, or taxpayer's dependent.
To be eligible for the HOPE credit, a student must take at least one-half the
full-time course load for at least one academic term at a qualifying educational
institution. There is no time and load requirement for the Lifetime Learning credit.
The Lifetime Learning credit may be used by taxpayers who are seeking new job
skills or maintaining existing skills through graduate training or continuing education.
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Taxpayers with modified adjusted gross income above $50,000 ($100,000 for
married filing jointly) cannot claim an education credit. The credit is phased out
ratably for taxpayers that have modified adjusted gross income between $42,000 and
$52,000 ($83,000 and $103,000 for married filing jointly). An education credit
cannot be claimed if a married taxpayer files a separate return.
The AGI and use
limitations make the credits less desirable than the §162 expense deduction.
V. OTHER EDUCATIONAL BENEFITS
Other educational benefits include the deduction of interest on student loans
under Code §221, tax-free distributions from a Coverdell education savings account
under Code §530, early withdrawals from traditional and Roth IRAs for educational
expenses, state tuition programs under Code § 529, exclusion of interest from
educational savings bonds, and employer education assistance programs.
An employee who receives employer-provided educational assistance may
exclude up to $5,250 per year for amounts paid for tuition, including graduate school
tuition for expenses related to courses, fees and related expenses under Code §127.
Under Code §127, as long as an employer maintains a qualified educational assistance
program, the cost of education provided through the program is eligible for exclusion
and there is no need to distinguish between job related education and education taken
for personal purposes.xi
No double benefits are allowed, so if a taxpayer claims a deduction for higher
education expenses under any Code section, a credit or deduction for the same
expenses under another Code section cannot be claimed.
VI. MBA EXPENSES
IRC §162(a)xii states:
There shall be allowed as a deduction all the ordinary and necessary
expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year in carrying on any
trade or business…”
Treasury Regulation 1.162-5(a)(1) and (2),xiii states:
(a) General rule. Expenditures made by an individual for education (including
research undertaken as part of his educational program) which are not expenditures of
a type described in paragraph (b)(2) or (3) of this section are deductible as ordinary
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and necessary business expenses (even though the education may lead to a degree) if
the education-Maintains or improves skills required by the individual in his employment or
other trade or business, or
Meets the express requirements of the individual's employer, or the
requirements of applicable law or regulations, imposed as a condition to the retention
by the individual of an established employment relationship, status, or rate of
compensation.
In the definition of the phrase, “ordinary and necessary,” the word "necessary,"
as used by Congress, has been construed to mean "appropriate" or "helpful" rather
than "indispensable" or "required,"xiv Because earning an MBA is both “appropriate”
and “helpful” for certain taxpayers, there are circumstances in which MBA expenses
might be allowed. However, the courts have now begun to weigh in on what other
attributes must be present in order for graduate MBA expenses to be deductible.
The court in Johnson v. United States of America,xv the court explained:
As is apparent, the regulations treat educational expenses from two
points of view. Paragraphs (a)(1) and (2) give the requirements which
must be met before deduction can be allowed. Paragraphs (b)(2) and (3)
on the other hand list instances wherein deduction will not be allowed. It
is clear that in order for an educational expense to be deductible it must
escape the prohibitions contained in (b)(2) and (3) as well as fulfill the
express requirements of (a)(1) and (2).* * *
In order for plaintiff to fulfill the requirements of (a)(1) and (2) it is
necessary that he either be employed or engaged in carrying on a trade or
business. Rev. Rul. 60-97 1960-1 Cum. Bull. 69. Canter v. U. S. [66-1
USTC ¶9118], 354 F. 2d 352 (Ct. Cl. 1965).
VII. ESTABLISHED IN A TRADE OR BUSINESS
Implicit in both IRC §162 and the related regulations is that the taxpayer must
be established in a trade or business or employed before any expenses are deductible
as “trade and business” expenses. The question of whether a taxpayer is established
in a trade or business is one of fact. Can a taxpayer be both employed, currently
unemployed, or running a trade or business, and enrolled in a graduate program and
still be considered “established in a trade or business?”
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There are several court cases that carefully looked at the definition of
“established” in a trade or business. In 1981, the Tax Court (Memorandum Decision)
in Reisine v. Commissionerxvi held that limited business experience before earning an
MBA was not sufficient to be allowed a deduction. Specifically, the taxpayer was an
engineer who was employed by Bendix for one year prior to attending Coleville
University to obtain both a master’s and an Ph.D. degree in engineering. The
expenses in that case were disallowed because the taxpayer was not sufficiently
established in a trade or business. The court held that since taxpayer worked only
one year and was not a manager, he was not “sufficiently established”.
However, in Ruehmann v. Commissionerxvii, one of the distinguishing aspects
was that taxpayer obtained an official “leave of absence” from an employer after only
three and one-half months of on-the-job employment. Taxpayer had passed the
Georgia bar and had obtained his law degree prior to commencing employment with a
law firm in June of 1967. The law firm had accepted him as a permanent associate,
and it was the firm's policy to permit leaves of absence to pursue graduate legal
studies. Prior to graduation from law school taxpayer had been accepted into a Master
of Laws (LLM) program at Harvard University. He worked for the law firm from
June until September of 1967 and then commenced the one-year LLM program. The
taxpayer was allowed to deduct the expenses of attending Harvard based on a finding
that he was “engaged in a trade or business.”
In Sherman v. Commissioner,xviii an individual left his position as a manager to
pursue a full-time graduate course in business administration. He was allowed a
deduction for the cost of attending school, even though he was not on “leave of
absence” status while attending school and he had accepted another position from a
different company upon graduation. The Tax Court (Memorandum Decision) held he
had merely suspended active participation in the management responsibilities field
while at school for two years and had returned to the field of employment with
management responsibility upon graduation.
In the Sherman case, the taxpayer had worked as a military officer for three
years and then an additional two years as Chief of Plans and Programs Office in Viet
Nam. After acting as an enlisted officer for three years, he received managerial
responsibility for two years and then entered into Harvard’s MBA program.
Whether a taxpayer is engaged in carrying on a trade or business is a
question of fact. Corbett v. Commissioner [Dec. 30,669 ], 55 T. C. 884,
887 (1971).
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For the two years immediately preceding petitioner's matriculation in the
Harvard Graduate Business School petitioner was employed by the
Army and Air Force Exchange Service (AAFES) as Chief, Plans and
Programs Office, in Viet Nam. We conclude on the facts that this was a
sufficient period of time for petitioner to have established himself in the
business of being an employee who was an administrator and planner (i.
e., business manager).xix
Respondent's second contention is that petitioner has not proved that he
was "carrying on" a trade or business at the time he incurred the
educational expenses in issue. Petitioner was not employed while he
was enrolled full time for two years in the Harvard Graduate School of
Business.
We have held that a taxpayer who temporarily ceases active participation
in a trade or business during a transition period between leaving one
position and obtaining another may be "carrying on" a trade or business
during the transition period. Haft v. Commissioner [Dec. 26,049 ], 40 T.
C. 2 (1963). Likewise, a taxpayer who leaves his position temporarily to
attend school full time may be "carrying on" a trade or business while in
school. The Seventh Circuit in Furner v. Commissioner [68-1 USTC
¶9234 ], 393 F. 2d 292 (1968), rev'g [Dec. 28,182 ], 47 T. C. 165 (1966),
held that a school teacher, who resigned from her teaching position when
she could not get a leave of absence to attend graduate school full time
for a year, and who after finishing graduate work took a different
teaching job in another school districtxx was "carrying on" her trade or
business of being a teacher while in graduate school. And we held in a
reviewed decision, Ford v. Commissioner [Dec. 30,986 ], 56 T. C. 1300
(1971), aff'd per curiam [73-2 USTC ¶9798 ] 487 F. 2d 1025 (9th Cir.
1973), that another teacher was in the trade or business of teaching while
attending the University of Oslo in Norway full time for one year after
leaving a teaching job in one school district (without a leave of absence)
and before returning to another teaching job in another district. These
cases establish that a leave of absence is not essential to carry on a trade
or business while attending school, nor is it essential to return to the
same position after completing the course of study undertaken.
However, when a taxpayer leaves his trade or business for a prolonged
period of study with no apparent continuing connection with either his
former job or any clear indication of an intention to actively carry on the
same trade or business upon completion of study, the taxpayer is not
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"carrying on" his trade or business while attending school. Canter v.
United States [66-1 USTC ¶9118 ], 354 F. 2d 352 (Ct. Cls. 1965) (a
nurse discontinued nursing activities for more than four years while
obtaining Bachelor's and Master's degrees in nursing); Corbett v.
Commissioner [Dec. 30,669 ], 55 T. C. 884 (1971) (a teacher
discontinued teaching and commenced full time study leading to a Ph.D.,
and four years later at time of trial was still a full time student).
We hold on the facts that petitioner was "carrying on" his trade or
business of being a business manager while attending Harvard Graduate
Business School for two years. He sought, but was refused, a leave of
absence from his job with AAFES in order to attend school and study for
an MBA. The MBA would not equip him for a different career. He was
engaged in business administration before he went to Harvard, and
stayed in the field after his graduation. The MBA rather was expected to
equip him to be a better manager than he had been. He sought to return
to his job with AAFES after obtaining his degree, but was not reemployed because AAFES was cutting back in Viet Nam. Therefore he
took another job, utilizing his management, administrative and planning
skills, with Radix Corporation in the Orient. These facts bring petitioner
within the scope of Furner and Ford, and his temporary cessation of
active participation in the business of being a managerial employee did
not prevent him from "carrying on" a trade or business within the
meaning of section 162 , while attending Harvard.
A taxpayer who temporarily ceases active participation in a trade or business
during a transition period between leaving one position and obtaining another may
still be "carrying on" a trade or business during the transition period.xxi Likewise, a
taxpayer who leaves his position temporarily to attend school full time may be
"carrying on" a trade or business while in school.
However, if taxpayer has quit his job prior to going to school and has no
intention of returning, he is not “engaged” in the field.
As indicated by the express language of section 162(a) , referred to
above, in order for educational expenses to be deductible, the taxpayer
must be engaged in a trade or business during the period the education is
undertaken. In other words, the "expenditure must relate to activities
which amount to the present carrying on of an existing business."
Corbett v. Commissioner [Dec. 30,669 ], 55 T. C. 884, 887 (1971); see
Canter v. United States [66-1 USTC ¶9118 ], 354 F. 2d 352, 173 Ct. Cl.
Mountain Plains Journal of Business and Economics, Volume 6, 2005

67

723 (1965). The cessation of a trade or business by a taxpayer in order to
undertake full-time study will disqualify the deduction if the cessation is
indefinite rather than temporary. Furner v. Commissioner [68-1 USTC
¶9234 ], 393 F. 2d 292, 294 (7th Cir. 1968), revg. [Dec. 28,182 ] 47 T.
C. 165 (1966); Corbett v. Commissioner, supra.xxii
In Wassenaar v. Commissionerxxiii a law school graduate who was not yet
admitted to the bar sought to deduct the cost of a masters program in taxation as a
business educational expense. The court denied the deduction on the grounds that at
the time the taxpayer took the masters courses he was not yet in the trade or business
of being an attorney; consequently, the courses did not maintain or improve his skills
in an existing trade or business and were part of a program of study leading to his
entering a new trade or business.
In order to constitute maintenance or improvement of business skills, a
taxpayer must be engaged in the trade or business at the time he incurs
the educational expenses. Jungreis v. Commissioner [Dec. 30,600 ], 55
T. C. 581, 588 (1970). It is well established that membership in good
standing in a profession is not equivalent to carrying on the profession
for purposes of section 162(a) . Ford v. Commissioner [Dec. 30,986 ], 56
T. C. 1300, 1304 (1971), affd. per curiam, 487 F. 2d 1025 (9th Cir.
1973). In the case of a lawyer, mere admission to a bar does not place a
taxpayer in the trade or business of practicing law. Wassenaar v.
Commissioner [Dec. 36,359 ], 72 T. C. 1195, 1199-1200 (1979).xxiv
The Seventh Circuit, in Furner v. Commissionerxxv held that a school teacher,
who resigned from her teaching position when she could not get a leave of absence to
attend graduate school full time for a year, and who after finishing graduate work took
a different teaching job in another school district, was "carrying on" her trade or
business of being a teacher while in graduate school.
The taxpayer’s establishment in the business must immediately precede the
education.xxvi Further, when the time is short in duration, the court looks at the
taxpayer’s entire employment history to establish a pattern.
There are a number of factors indicating that petitioner's employment at
Xerox was merely a temporary hiatus in a continuing series of academic
endeavors. The first is the period of time of employment, both in
absolute and relative terms. Petitioner worked only 3 months at Xerox
before leaving to attend graduate school. While we decline to set a
minimum period of time that one must be employed, such a short period
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of time is relevant evidence. In addition, viewing petitioner's post-high
school activities as a continuum, he was employed in his field only 3
months out of a total 6 years. Moreover, he effectively ceased
employment when he returned to school. The job at Xerox was but
another summer position in an otherwise continuous pattern of schooling
which petitioner decided he needed prior to establishing himself in a
trade or business.xxvii
In Rance v. Commissioner, 45 TCM 956, TC Memo. 1983-129, Rance, who had been
an investigator for the state of California went to law school. He tried to take a
deduction for the expenses, but they were denied. The court held:
Petitioners argue that the legal courses Rance took in 1977 are not "part
of a program of study * * * which will lead to qualifying him in a new
trade or business" because Rance did not complete the whole law school
curriculum in 1977. In addition, petitioners contend that admission to
the bar alone qualifies one for practicing law and that Rance was not
admitted to the bar until later years.
There is absolutely no merit to petitioners' arguments. This Court has
consistently disallowed education deductions taken by non-lawyers for
attending law school. See, e.g., Bodley v. Commissioner [Dec. 30,989], 56 T. C.
1357 (1971); Weiler v. Commissioner [Dec. 29,989 ], 54 T. C. 398 (1970);
Bradley v. Commissioner [Dec. 29,952 ], 54 T. C. 216 (1970); Weiszmann v.
Commissioner [Dec. 29,765 ] 52 T. C. 1106 (1969), affd. per curiam [71-1
USTC ¶9312] 443 F. 2d 29 (9th Cir. 1971). In each of the above-cited cases,
the taxable year before the Court was a year prior to the taxpayer's graduating
from law school and prior to the taxpayer's passing the bar. Nevertheless, we
held that the early years of law school were part of a course of study which
would lead to qualification in a new trade or business. For the reasons stated in
the above-cited cases, we hold that Rance's courses were part of a program
which would lead to qualifying him in a new trade or business.
VIII. IS AN EMPLOYEE ACTIVELY ENGAGED IN A TRADE OR
BUSINESS?
Can a taxpayer who is employed for two years with managerial responsibilities,
such as a supervisor, after his first year of non-managerial responsibility, have
sufficient experience to arguably be engaged in a “trade or business?” In Primuth v.
Commissionerxxviii, the court held a taxpayer may be in the trade or business of being
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an employee, such as a corporate executive or manager.
IX. INTENTION TO RETURN
Taxpayer must have the intention to return to the same job field. A nuclear
engineer was denied a deduction for educational expenses. He had no apparent
intention of returning to his former job or job field and, therefore, was not involved in
a trade or business.xxix In addition, the intention cannot be general. It must be specific.
A taxpayer who was employed as an engineer resigned this position to take up
graduate studies in engineering. The education was undertaken
to pursue his general educational aspirations and with the intention of resuming a
trade or business at some future date. He was denied the deduction.xxx
X. THE IRS POSITION
After the Furner v Commissioner case,xxxi (pre-Sherman) the Treasury
Department issued Rev. Rul. 68-591, 1968-2 C. B. 73, in which they stated that they
would follow Furner under certain circumstances, and in which they stated:
"Ordinarily a suspension for a period of a year or less, after which the taxpayer
resumes the same employment or trade or business, will be considered
temporary."
The IRS issued Letter Ruling 8538068, on June 26, 1985.xxxii The letter ruling
provided some light on whether a 2-year MBA course of instruction could be
construed as temporary and not indefinite. The letter ruling stated, ordinarily, a
suspension for a period of a year or less,
after which the taxpayer resumes the same employment or trade or business, will be
considered temporary.
The letter ruling also stipulated the following (rearranged for emphasis):
In support of your position that the educational expenses you have incurred are
deductible under section 162(a) of the Code, you rely on Sherman v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1977-301, where the court held that an individual
who
1.
2.

left his position as a manager,
to pursue a full-time graduate course in business administration could
deduct the cost of attending school. Although the taxpayer was not on
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3.

leave status while attending school, and
he accepted another [managerial] position upon graduation, he had
merely suspended active participation in the management field while at
school for two years and had returned to the field upon graduation.

Even though the government lost the Sherman case, Rev. Ruls. 60-97 and 68591 remain the position of the Internal Revenue Service. Therefore, since you
suspended your employment for a period of two years while pursuing an MBA
degree, the expenses incurred in obtaining that degree are not deductible under
section 162(a) of the Code.
Thus, despite the case law which looks for a pattern of prior establishment in a
business, leave for a period of time and intent to return to the line of business, the IRS
has taken an arbitrary position, possibly for administrative convenience. It is
interesting to note, that this position was not taken in the Regulation, and was not
reiterated in Publication 508.
The IRS’s position is, at best, capricious and ill-reasoned. Suppose taxpayer
goes to school for nine months and returns to work for three. After the three months,
he goes back and finishes the final nine months of school. Has he had two one year or
less periods of time? If the program is a two-year program, what length of time is
necessary back on the job before he can complete his program? According to the Tax
court these expenses should be deductible without having to go through this charade.
According to the IRS they will not be deductible, but they have not ruled under what
conditions the taxpayer may resume his education. This is not only silliness, but it is
arbitrary. Further, it could result in additional cost to the Treasury. Suppose the
program is in another state. If the first year’s expenses are covered, that will include
moving expenses and the expenses of starting up a household. If the taxpayer must
return to work and then move again after a period of time this is costly in dollars as
well as effort and time. Surely, it would be better to let the taxpayer finish the
program. Perhaps a rule that taxpayer must be continuously working on the program
with the intent to return to the job field in a reasonable period of time, would be more
appropriate.
Respondent's third contention is that petitioner's suspension from his
established trade or business was not temporary and definite. After the
Furner decision respondent issued Rev. Rul. 68-591 , 1968-2 C. B. 73,
in which he stated that he would follow Furner under certain
circumstances, and in which he further stated: "Ordinarily a suspension
for a period of a year or less, after which the taxpayer resumes the same
employment or trade or business, will be considered temporary."
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As this Court has frequently noted, a revenue ruling is no more than the
opinion of one of the litigants in the case. E.g., Estate of Lang v.
Commissioner [Dec. 33,258 ], 64 T. C. 404, 406-407 (1975), on appeal
(9th Cir. January 6, 1976). There is no magic in a one year limit on
"temporary" (other than possible ease of administration), and we believe
a facts and circumstances test is the appropriate test for determining
whether a hiatus is temporary rather than indefinite.xxxiii The course of
instruction for the MBA was quite definite in length--two years. We find
nothing in section 162 justifying us in following
an arbitrary one-year limit on self-improvement progress. Under the
facts of this case we hold that petitioner's two-year suspension of active
participation in his business was temporary and definite.xxxiv
In Letter Ruling 9112003, (Dec. 18, 1990), the IRS provided an interesting
analysis of their mix of the one year rule with the analysis in Sherman:
Rev. Rul. 68-591 , 1968-2 C.B. 73, which follows Furner v.
Commissioner, 393 F.2d 292 (7th Cir. 1968), provides that amounts
spent by a teacher who left her position to pursue a graduate degree as a
full-time student for one academic year were deductible as educational
expenses under section 1.162-5 of the regulations, even though the
petitioner temporarily ceased to engage actively in her employment.
During the course of her studies, the petitioner accepted a teaching
position beginning immediately after graduation from the master's
program. The Service stated in Rev. Rul. 68-591 that ordinarily, a
suspension of a year or less, after which the taxpayer resumes the same
employment or trade or business, will be considered temporary.
Ruehmann v. Commissioner, T.C.M. 1971-157, holds that the petitioner,
an attorney, was entitled to deduct the cost of obtaining an LL.M.
degree. Upon graduating from law school in June 1967, and having
already passed the bar, the petitioner was engaged in the trade or
business of practicing law from June to September 1967. The petitioner
then entered into a graduate law program to obtain his LL.M. degree.
Following graduation from the LL.M. program the petitioner was
employed by a law firm for a three month period after which he entered
into the office of the judge Advocate General of the Department of the
Army, where he performed legal services. The court opined that the
courses taken by the petitioner improved upon skills required in the
practice of law, rather than qualify the petitioner in a new trade or
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business or were necessary to meet the minimum educational
requirements of a legal position or the legal profession.
Kohen v. Commissioner, T.C.M. 1982-625, holds that the petitioner was
not entitled to deduct, as trade or business expenses, amounts incurred in
the procurement of a master's degree in taxation. In the months between
graduation from law school and enrollment in the graduate law program,
the petitioner did not hold himself out as an attorney, nor did he perform
legal services. Noting that section 162 requires one to be engaged in a
trade or business at the time an expense is incurred, the court stated that
the petitioner was a full time student during the time in question and not
engaged in the practice of law prior to enrolling in the LL.M. program,
therefore, the expenses were personal and nondeductible.
Based upon the submitted facts, the issue presented by X is analogous to
that of the petitioners in both Rev. Rul. 68-591 and Ruehmann. Prior to
undertaking graduate studies at Y, X was engaged in the full-time
practice of law for approximately four years. X anticipates that he will
temporarily cease to practice law on a full-time basis for approximately
nine months. During the course of his studies, X will continue to
perform legal services for his clients on limited basis and will make
reasonable efforts to resume the practice of law after completing his
graduate work. In other words, X is taking a suspension of less than a
year from the full-time trade or business of practicing law. X's studies
are supplemental to the minimum educational requirements of the legal
profession and improve upon skills required in the practice of law, rather
than qualify him in a new trade or business. Accordingly, amounts
incurred by X in the pursuit of obtaining a master's degree in taxation are
deductible as business expenses under section 162 of the Code. This
ruling is based on X's representation that he intends to return to the
practice of law upon completion of the master's program and that he
makes a good faith attempt to obtain such a position.
Longer periods of time have been allowed in several cases.xxxv
XI. MINIMUM EDUCATION REQUIREMENTS
Reg § 1.162-5 provides that no business deduction will be allowed if the
education qualifies the taxpayer for another trade or business. A taxpayer getting an
MBA is obtaining additional coursework that better enables him to be a manager.
However, does an MBA qualify the taxpayer for another trade or business?
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Unlike the graduate student pursuing a medical degree, JD degree, MAcc
degree, or other specialized graduate professional degree, the MBA graduate
presumably has not qualified taxpayer for a new trade or business. When the earned
degree helps qualify the taxpayer for another professional career, the education
deductions are not deductible. The unique aspect of the MBA is that there are no state
licensing requirements for MBAs. Thus, non-MBAs can act as business managers.
Expenses for education are deductible if the education is undertaken primarily
for the purpose of maintaining or improving skills required by the taxpayer in his
trade or business. These expenses, however, are not deductible if they are for
education undertaken for the purposes of obtaining a new position or substantial
advancement in position, or in order to meet the minimum requirements for
qualification in his intended trade or business (or specialty therein) ( Prior 1967
language). The regulations indicate that, if educational expenses either qualify one to
meet the minimum educational requirements of one's employment or qualify one for a
new trade or business they are not deductible even though the education has the
incidental effect of maintaining or improving skills required in the existing
employment, trade or practice. §1.162-5(b)(1).
XII. CAN THE SHERMAN CASE STAND?
The courts have taken the stand that MBA expenses or any educational
expenses that do not lead to a new profession, may be deductible under Reg.§ 162-5 if
the taxpayer was established in the job field before going for his education, got
education that was definite in duration and improved his job skills, and had the intent
of returning to the job field. The IRS has taken the position that those expenses must
be incurred in less than one year. The courts have said that is ridiculous and a facts
and circumstances test is more appropriate. The IRS has also stated in its Publication
508 that the expenses, if deductible, must be deductible from AGI unless the taxpayer
is a sole proprietor. Although not specifically on point, the courts have quoted the
language of the Regulation that the deduction is for AGI.
Thus, taxpayers desiring to take deductible educational expenses for an MBA
degree need to be aware that the IRS has drawn battle lines. Taxpayers will probably
win if they come within the court’s parameters, but not without a court battle.
XIII. ALTERNATIVES
In the alternative, if taxpayer’s expenses do not come under the definition of
Code §162 expenses, they may still be deductible under one of the other code
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sections. For the next few years the expenses may be deductible under Code §222.
Taxpayers may also qualify for a combination of deduction and credits if the expenses
exceed the limits in either category. Unfortunately, most of these deductions have
AGI limitations, or other limitations regarding who can take the expenses that may
make this alternative unavailable.
However, with a little pre-planning, taxpayers may be able to qualify for
deductions under other code sections such as the deduction of interest on student
loans, tax-free distributions from a Coverdell education savings accounts, early
withdrawals from traditional and Roth IRAs for educational expenses, state tuition
programs, exclusion of interest from educational savings bonds, and employer
education assistance programs.
XIV. HOW SHOULD THE CLAIMED DEDUCTIONS
BE REPORTED ON THE INDIVIDUAL’S TAX RETURN?
Because these educational expenses have been deemed “trade or business”
expenses, they are deemed to be deductions “for AGI.” IRC §62(a)(1) states the
following:
“For the purposes of this subtitle, the term “adjusted gross income” means,
in the case of an individual, gross income minus the following deduction:
(1) TRADE AND BUSINESS DEDUCTIONS. —The deductions allowed by
this
chapter (other than by part VII of this subchapter) which are attributable to a
trade
or business carried on by the taxpayer, if such trade or business does not consist
of the performance of services by the taxpayer as an employee.”xxxvi
Because these expenses are not paid by the taxpayer in connection with his
employment, but after his employment, and before his accepting another managerial
position upon graduation, these expenses are not in connection with his being an
employee. Rather, these expenses are in connection with his “trade or business” as
being an employee for hire, in the direct past and in the direct future, but not as
instantly present, which is construed to be an acceptable, at least arguable, per the
Sherman Case, a “temporary absence” from employment. And being a taxpayer for
hire as an employee is construed to be the taxpayer’s “trade or business.”
Therefore, the deduction should be listed as a deduction “for AGI” and not as a
miscellaneous deduction, as a deduction “from AGI”, as suggested by Code
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§62(a)(2)(A) and found not supportable in the T.C. Summary Opinion 2003-58,
Petitioner Yuanqiang Zhang, Petitioner v. commissioner, Respondent Case. If you list
the item as an “unreimbursed employee expense” and the taxpayer is not currently
employed, the IRS knocks this tax position right out of the ballpark as a de facto noncompliance statutory position.
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